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In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court aimed to
give "intelligible content to the right of jury trial."' At
present, however, the nature of that content appears less
than obvious. By declaring the principle that facts resulting
in enhanced sentences must be proven to a jury, the Court
has raised a number of unanswered questions. One of
these is the question of which sentencing regimes beyond
the State of Washington the ruling will eventually affect.
Another is whether application of the ruling might prompt
abandonment of guidelines altogether, and a return to
indeterminate sentencing by judges. But another question
- only beginning to be explored - is what procedures
would be needed in a system that both implements
Blakely and preserves sentencing guidelines. In short,
how can determinate sentencing be implemented in a
way that respects the Court's interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment?
The Court's decision offers little guidance as to what
precise form a "Blakely jury" might take. What factors
would be submitted to the jury and what instructions
would be given? Would it be necessary to present sentenc-
ing issues to the jury in a separate hearing, distinct from
the trial itself? If so, what evidentiary rules would apply?2
If Blakely is applied to the federal sentencing guide-
lines, these questions and others related to them will likely
occupy the attention of courts and legislatures for some
time to come. But an initial attempt to answer these ques-
tions might begin with the decisions of federal courts that
have already sought to apply Blakely without abandoning
the guidelines. Several of these courts have empanelled
special juries to find the facts relevant to sentencing
enhancements.3 Another helpful source of information
is Kansas, the only jurisdiction in which the legislature
has already provided for a modified guided sentencing
scheme consistent with Blakely.4 More guidance can be
found in the handful of state systems where discretionary
jury sentencing still exists, 5 and in the larger number of
jurisdictions where jury sentencing is used only for capital
cases.
These practical questions raised by Blakely point to an
understanding of the jury's role at sentencing principally
as safeguarding the rights of the defendant. Blakely intro-
duces more formality and greater procedural protections
during sentencing than exist under most current sentenc-
ing schemes. The government's sentencing allegations
would be put to a higher standard of proof and to the
test of an adversarial hearing. The allegations would then
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be checked by twelve ordinary citizens, rather than by
employees of the state. The jury would be theneutral
decisionmaker that restrains the state's ability to impose
factually contested sentencing enhancements.
Still, the implications of Blakely stop well short of the
more expansive understandings of the jury present in
several state systems and implicit in some Supreme Court
jurisprudence. While Blakely jurors would be making
important factual findings, they would remain ignorant
of the consequences of their findings.
A more complete endorsement of the jury would take
into account the jury's ability to deliberate as a democratic
body about the moral and legal questions inherent in
sentencing. Some of the Court's statements in Blakely
hint at the democratic features that qualify the jury to
be more than a mere factfinder. It is therefore possible
that the decision could prompt a conversation about even
greater involvement of jurors in the sentencing process.
A. Facts To Be Decided by Blakely Juries
Blakely requires a jury finding on all facts that push
a sentence beyond a legally prescribed range, whether
the range is established by a statute or by legislatively
mandated guidelines. But what questions are facts to be
decided by jurors is not always obvious. Factors pertinent
to sentencing are often complex and involve legal, factual
and value judgments all at once. This murky boundary
between law and fact makes the application of Blakely
difficult.
Some questions are clearly factual and will be entrusted
to the jury: What quantity of drugs did the defendant sell?
Did the defendant use a gun? But other determinations,
such as the role of the defendant in a conspiracy and the
definition of loss in a complex fraud scheme,6 involve
mixed questions of fact and law. Courts may be reluctant
to send such mixed questions to the jury. One post-Blakely
court has already held, for example, that the calculation of
the offender's criminal score falls to the judge, because it
is based on mixed questions of fact and law.7 Others have
suggested that the court should attempt to separate the
factual from the legal determinations, and submit only
the former to the jury.8
Where separation of factual and legal issues is im-
possible, the most recent and relevant authority suggests
that mixed questions should still go to the jury. In United
States v. Gaudin, a pre-Apprendi case, the Supreme Court
held that mixed questions of law and fact, such as the
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materiality of a false statement, properly fall within the
jury's province at trial.9 Blakely itself held that the ques-
tion of whether the crime was committed with "deliberate
cruelty," arguably a mixed question, is for the jury to
resolve.'"
It is also possible to distinguish among categories of
facts and to submit only certain offense-related facts to
the jury. In oral arguments for United States v. Booker
and United States v. Fanfan, the two cases in which the
Supreme Court will decide whether to extend Blakely to
the federal sentencing guidelines, Justice Kennedy raised
the possibility that the jury should determine only those
facts that are most akin to traditional elements of the
crime - drug quantity or use of a gun, for example."
Other facts historically considered sentencing factors,
such as remorse of the defendant, would remain the
judge's responsibility to decide.'" Justice Kennedy has
made a similar distinction between these two types of facts
before. In Mitchell v. United States, he wrote the majority
opinion holding that a defendant's silence about facts
that concern "the circumstances and details of the crime"
could not give rise to an adverse inference at sentencing.3
By contrast, courts could draw adverse inferences from
the defendant's refusal to speak about his remorse, since
remorse has traditionally been a pure sentencing factor
and is not related to the circumstances of the offense.
Drawing upon Justice Kennedy's reasoning, others
have identified a distinction between "offense facts" and
"offender facts" and argued that only the former should
be determined by a jury. Doug Berman has noted that
"the state accuses and prosecutes persons for what they
do, not for who they are; consequently the jury trial right
concerns offense conduct while having no application to
offender characteristics."'4 As Berman points out, this
interpretation has a solid textual basis.' 5 The Constitution
refers to a jury trial right for "crimes" and "prosecutions,"
suggesting that the jury should determine only facts
pertaining to offense conduct. 6 This approach might
also be seen as a reasonable means of limiting Blakelys
impact, since fewer facts would go the jury.
The distinction between offender and offense-related
facts, however, is often not clear. Certain facts can be of-
fense facts and offender characteristics at the same time.
For example, is it an offender- or offense-related fact that
the defendant committed the crime out of racial bias or
that he was the leader in a criminal organization? Other
determinations, such as the defendant's amenability to
probation or future dangerousness, also seem to concern
both offense-related facts and offender characteristics.
More importantly, it is not certain that offender charac-
teristics are the only facts extrinsic to the charged offense
and thus outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
An alternative approach would view as "extrinsic"
those facts that are removed in time and context from
the charged offense. This dividing line should not be too
difficult to administer. Courts already distinguish in a
similar fashion between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" facts
under Federal Rule of Evidence 4 o4 (b). Under Rule 404
(b),' 7 facts are considered extrinsic to the offense (and
generally inadmissible) when they relate to events that
occur at a different time and under different circumstances
from the charged offense. 8
Following the intrinsic/extrinsic facts distinction, a
post-Blakely court could submit to the jury only those
sentence-aggravating facts that are contemporaneous
with the charged offense or otherwise closely intertwined
with it.'9 Because prior convictions occur before the of-
fense charged, the jury would not consider the simple fact
of a prior conviction. The jury would be involved, however,
where a sentencing enhancement rests on a finding that
a defendant has committed crimes "of increasing serious-
ness." For purposes of that enhancement, the prior con-
viction is closely intertwined with the facts of the charged
offense and falls within the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
In the end, even a clear distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic facts may be in tension with the principle
underlying Blakely. Both Apprendi and Blakely look
to the consequences of facts, not to the way facts are
formally categorized." It is possible that courts following
Blakely would reject both the intrinsic/extrinsic and the
offense/offender distinctions and require that all sentence-
enhancing facts be found by a jury.
From the standpoint of institutional competence, there
is little reason to keep juries from deciding sentence-
aggravating facts extrinsic to the charged offense. As long
as the trial is bifurcated to prevent prejudicial evidence
from influencing the guilt/innocence determination," the
jury is well-capable of finding facts that occur before and
after the offense, as well as during the offense.
B. Recidivism Determinations
A related and important question about Blakel/s scope
is whether juries would determine questions of recidi-
vism. The answer may hinge largely on whether the
Supreme Court reconsiders its pre-Apprendi decision,
Almendarez-Torres v. United States," holding that the
fact of a prior conviction should be found by a judge. Even
if Almendarez-Torres is overturned, some recidivism de-
terminations may still be kept away from the jury on the
grounds that they entail legal judgments or facts extrinsic
to the offense.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Supreme
Court excluded prior convictions from the list of sentence
aggravators that have to be proven to a jury.23 In Jones v.
United States, the Court reaffirmed its position, noting
that "a prior conviction must itself have been established
through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable
doubt, and jury trial guarantees." 24 The Sixth Amendment
was not violated in submitting the prior conviction to
the judge, because the defendant had already had the
opportunity to have a jury finding on the facts of the
previous offense.
Consistent with Almendarez-Torres, lower courts
after Blakely have commonly held that recidivism
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determinations should be left with the judge: 5 These
court decisions may need to be revisited, however, if in de-
ciding Shepard v. United States this term,26 the Supreme
Court rejects the "prior conviction" exception to Apprendi.
There is a reason to believe this could happen. Blakely has
arguably redefined the meaning of "sentencing factor"
developed in Almendarez-Torres. After Blakely, any factor
that increases the sentence beyond a legally prescribed
range must either be admitted by the defendant or decided
by a jury. Taken literally, prior convictions would appear
to fit this description. Justice Thomas, who voted with the
5-4 majority in Almendarez-Torres, may now agree with
this argument. 7
Even if prior convictions might literally fall within the
ambit of Blakely, there are good reasons to believe that
the Court will stop short of rejecting the prior conviction
exception outright. The fact of a prior conviction is almost
invariably a matter of public record that can easily be
confirmed by judicial inquiry." The prior conviction
has already been admitted by the defendant or proven
to a jury. Prosecutors can be expected to argue that
it would make little practical sense to ask the jury to
vote on whether to believe the public record. Further,
Blakely arguably requires that sentencing-enhancing
facts be not only proven to a jury, but also pled in the
indictment.' 9 Yet a requirement that prior convictions
be pled in the indictment might also appear excessive.
The inclusion of prior convictions in the indictment may
raise Double Jeopardy concems 3° and prejudice the jury's
determination on guilt or innocence.3' At the same time,
such inclusion hardly serves a clear notice purpose since
a defendant may reasonably be expected to be aware of his
own prior convictions. 3
The prejudicial effect of including prior convictions
in the indictment could be remedied by allowing the
defendant to sever the indictment. Alternatively, prosecu-
tors could announce their intent to seek a recidivism
enhancement through a pre-trial notice, rather than
through the indictment itself." The trial could also be
bifurcated to avoid prejudicing the jury's guilt/innocence
determination. 34 These procedural safeguards, however,
would be quite costly, and it is not clear that the ad-
ditional costs are warranted for the proof of facts that
have already been admitted by the defendant or con-
firmed by a jury in a prior proceeding. It is to be ex-
pected that even if Almendarez-Torres is overruled,
courts will try to find ways of limiting the number of
cases in which prior convictions need to be proven to a
jury.
For example, in the event that Almendarez-Torres is
overruled, it might still be argued that certain recidivism
questions should continue to be determined by judges,
on the ground that these questions are non-factual." That
argument is undoubtedly applicable to certain determina-
tions made by judges "as a matter of law," for example,
whether a prior felony was a crime of violence for pur-
poses of career offender status.36 Other determinations
about the nature of the prior crimes, however, such as
whether those crimes were of "increasing seriousness,"
are at least partly factual and may have to be submitted to a
jury.37
Another way in which courts could limit the cases in
which a jury determines prior convictions is by adopting
the intrinsic/extrinsic fact distinction discussed earlier.
Apprendi itself noted that the prior conviction exception
might endure because it "does not relate to the commis-
sion of the offense itself,"38 but rather to prior conduct.
Even if this distinction were to be adopted, many recidi-
vism determinations might be so intertwined with the
offense charged that they would need to be submitted
to the jury. For example, the question of a defendant's
"future dangerousness to society" is likely to be resolved
through findings related to both prior convictions and the
charged offense. Because the fact of prior conviction in
this case is closely intertwined with the facts of the offense,
the finding of "future dangerousness" might fall to the
jury.
C. Bifurcation
In considering how to proceed with Blakely juries, legis-
latures and courts must decide whether to provide for a
separate hearing for enhancement-related facts. Several
courts refusing to empanel Blakely juries have justi-
fied their decision at least partly on the grounds that
bifurcation would be cumbersome and unfeasible39 Yet
bifurcation is long-established practice in capital and non-
capital jury sentencing, as well as in civil jury damage
determinations.40
Bifurcation might not be necessary for all aggravating
facts. Some findings that are intrinsic to the crime, such
as whether the offense involved a fiduciary relationship,
could be resolved at trial. But in many cases, bifurca-
tion is indispensable to ensuring a fair trial. 4' Some of
the information yielding sentence enhancements, such
as character evidence and prior criminal history, may
unfairly influence the jury's determination of guilt or
innocence." A unitary trial could also place the defendant
in the awkward position of simultaneously arguing his
innocence and contesting sentencing facts of which he is
not supposed to have any knowledge if he were innocent.43
In some cases, the sentencing phase itself might need to
be bifurcated, to prevent the possibility that findings on
certain enhancement factors would be unduly prejudiced
by evidence relating to other factors, particularly evidence
of other crimes.44
Given the importance of bifurcation to the fair-
ness of jury sentencing, elements requiring bifurca-
tion are best identified in advance by legislation. As
a second-best solution, where the legislature finds it
too difficult to enumerate all the factors that would
require a separate hearing, it could, following the
Kansas model, let judges determine on a case-by-base
basis when bifurcation would be in the interest of
justice. 45
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D. Procedural and Evidentiary Rules at
Blakely Hearings
Assuming that proceedings are bifurcated to accommo-
date Blakely, what procedural and evidentiary rules would
apply to the sentencing factfinding stage? Blakely has
established that the burden of proof for facts that increase
the sentence beyond a legally prescribed range would be
beyond a reasonable doubt. But would the jury have to
make its decisions unanimously? There is no constitu-
tional requirement of a unanimous jury verdict at the
guilt-innocence stage.46 Nonetheless, many states con-
tinue to require unanimity, and judging by the experience
in Kansas and in traditional jury sentencing states, it
is possible that legislatures will import the unanimity
requirement from the trial stage.47
Whether the same evidentiary rules used at trial should
be applied at Blakely hearings is less clear. Under the
federal sentencing guidelines, judges are permitted to
consider "relevant information without regard to its ad-
missibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial,
provided that the information has sufficient indicia of re-
liability to support its probable accuracy." 4' At capital jury
sentencing proceedings, too, rules of evidence are relaxed49
or not applicable at all.5' Illegally obtained evidence and ev-
idence that violates the Confrontation Clause, however, is
generally excluded from capital sentencing proceedings. 5'
Because Blakely factors function as elements and must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the same consti-
tutional safeguards would likely apply during sentencing
factfinding pursuant to Blakely.5' It is less certain that
the Rules of Evidence would automatically be imported
from trial. If legislatures find that more flexible rules are
preferable in presenting evidence relating to sentencing
enhancements, they would be constitutionally free to
depart from the current Rules."
It is worth noting that legislatures have adopted more
relaxed evidentiary standards at sentencing primarily in
order to allow decisionmaker to consider all relevant
mitigating factors.54 The consideration of such mitigating
evidence is deemed essential to the imposition of a fair
and individualized sentence. 55 Because Blakely would
apply only to consideration of aggravating facts, and the
jury will not be making the ultimate sentencing decision,
stricter admissibility rules would be more appropriate.
This approach would also be consistent with the Court's
general treatment of Blakely factors as quasi-elements of
the offense.
More significantly, if Blakely factors are found to
be the functional equivalent of elements, heightened
evidentiary and burden of proof standards should also
apply to sentencing hearings before judges, in cases
where the defendant has waived his right to a jury trial.56
The waiver of a jury trial does not indude a waiver of the
right to higher procedural protections. 57 Therefore, "the
Sixth Amendment protections of a higher burden of proof
and the application of the rules of evidence should apply
no matter which factfinder is selected." 58
Were Blakely interpreted to require greater procedural
protections at sentencing hearings before judges, it would
significantly alter the landscape of federal sentencing. Its
effect would no longer be limited to the small number
of cases where a plea agreement could not be reached. It
would apply across the board to all findings of aggravating
facts under a guided sentencing regime. According to
the Justice Department, applying the higher burden of
proof and evidentiary standards to judicial factfinding at
sentencing would render the federal sentencing guidelines
regime too costly to be feasible. 59 The additional costs
might be worth bearing, however, in order to enhance the
accuracy and fairness offactfinding that could significantly
increase a defendant's sentence.
E. Special Verdicts and the Ultimate Sentence
Blakely might transform criminal jury proceedings in
yet another fundamental way - it might move such
proceedings away from exclusive reliance on general
verdicts. Whether at the conclusion of a unitary trial or
after a separate sentencing hearing, a Blakely jury would
likely be asked to record its sentencing-related findings
on special verdict forms. On these forms, jurors would
respond to questions about their findings by simply
checking a box."°
If bifurcation is not adopted, the special verdict could
unduly influence the jury's guilt determination. "There
is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of
guilty than to approach it step by step.... By a progression
of questions each of which seems to require an answer
unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led
to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have
resisted."6'
Special verdict forms could also present practical
challenges of comprehension for the jury. Some federal
courts have refused to empanel Blakely juries in part
because the federal sentencing guidelines are seen as "too
complex for juries to decipher and apply correctly and
consistently. "62 Of particular concern are mass fraud and
conspiracy cases.' 3 Fraud cases, however, represent a small
percent of cases at the federal level, and the guidelines are
most frequently applied to drug, firearms and immigration
offenses. 64 Therefore, many of the determinations that
juries will make will be purely factual and will involve
only a few enhancement factors.65 Even where multiple
sentencing factors are present, courts will be able to
draw on prior experience in drafting interrogatories and
instructions under Apprendi and capital cases - not to
mention complex civil cases, including civil RICO and
fraud actions. 66 Jurors have generally proven adept at
handling such interrogatories and instructions. 67 At the
same time, inconsistent application of the guidelines has
occurred even under the current regime of professional
sentencing. At least one empirical study has shown that
probation officers' uncertainty about the meaning of
various guideline provisions has resulted in significantly
disparate sentence recommendations .68
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If the requirements of Blakely are to be carried out
without abandoning determinate sentencing, there seems
to be little choice but to devise the requisite forms and
instructions. The Sixth Amendment does not evaporate
simply because the guidelines are too complex. 9 Con-
sequently, the move toward jury factfinding may finally
spurthe Sentencing Commission to simplify the federal
sentencing guidelines along the lines of the guidelines
used in Minnesota, Kansas, and Washington.
F. The Cost of Blakely Juries
One of the main reasons why many federal courts have
refused to convene sentencing juries after Blakely has
been the cost of such a procedure. Bifurcation has been
criticized as impractical and expensive, "a cumbersome,
burdensome procedure that, even in cases where there
is a plea agreement, would often result in a full trial in
order to resolve enhancement issues."7' Blakely juries are
expected to "cause substantial resource problems" and
"result in delays." 7' The Blakely dissenters themselves
expressed serious concerns about the costs of sentencing
juries. 72
Yet experience with the procedure at the state level
belies these concerns. In Kansas, jury sentencing hearings
have generally taken about an hour.73 Furthermore, the
number of cases affected by Apprendi/Blakely, at least in
state systems, is not likely to be high. In Kansas, fewer than
io% of criminal cases have been affected by the application
of Apprendi to the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines. 74 Juries
have been empanelled in only around twenty cases per
year in 2003 and 2004. 71 In Minnesota, less than 8%
of felony sentences (approximately i,ooo cases per year)
involve aggravated departures that would be affected by
Blakely.76 Of these cases, approximately 92% are resolved
through a guilty plea." Similarly, out of 30,000 felony
sentences in Washington last year, only about a hundred
cases involved upward departures without the consent of
the defendant. 78
It is also unlikely that Blakely would lead to an ex-
plosion in trials on sentencing enhancements. To date,
Kansas has not seen a significant increase in the num-
ber of trials related to aggravated departures. 79 Perhaps
one reason for this relative stability is the requirement in
Kansas that if a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, he
also waives the right to have a jury determine aggravating
circumstances.8" The same rule has been applied by most
jury sentencing states8' and by at least one federal court
that empanelled a jury to comply with Blakely.8 ,
Whether or not this double-waiver requirement is
applied more widely, the number of trials is unlikely to in-
crease significantly as a result of Blakely. In a plea-driven
system, enhancements are already adequately factored
into the bargains struck by prosecutors. Interviews with
prosecutors and judges in Kansas indicate that "it had
already been rare for judges to sentence defendants to
enhanced sentences after trial, largely because in a plea-
driven system the available sentences after trial are already
effectively 'enhanced."'8 3 In the end, unless the prior con-
viction exception to Blakely is abolished, many states will
be able to keep their current sentencing schemes intact.
Those that are affected by Blakely will likely implement
an easy fix along the lines of the Kansas model.84
The impact on the federal system is likely to be much
more significant. The federal sentencing guidelines in-
clude a greater number of sentencing factors affected
by Blakely.8 5 The Sentencing Commission estimates that
sixty-five percent of the 1,200 federal sentencings that
happen each week involve at least one Blakely factor.86
Furthermore; the guidelines sometimes require the jury to
make several enhancement-related findings in the same
case, which would significantly extend the sentencing
proceedings. In a recent case of a conspiracy to pass and
produce fraudulent money orders, the Blakely sentencing
hearing itself had to be bifurcated to allow for separate
consideration of an obstruction of justice enhancement.
The two sentencing hearings took four days of trial and
three days of deliberation for the jury to reach its findings
on a total of twenty-eight sentencing facts.8 7
As the U.S. Sentencing Commission itself acknowl-
edges, however, the impact of Blakely is still unknown,
and over the long run, it will be minimized as a result of
factual stipulations in plea bargains in more than ninety
percent of federal prosecutions.88 Although some con-
spiracy or mass fraud cases will entail longer jury trials
as a result of Blakely, the typical sentencing will involve
few enhancing factors - "just the drug quantity and a
gun. "89
In the end, whatever the costs of implementing Blakely,
the Court has made clear that when it comes to fulfilling
the mandates of the Sixth Amendment, principle-is more
important than pragmatism. Implementing Blakely, there-
fore, "cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury
impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice."9
It remains to be seen, of course, whether Congress and
the states will seek to avoid this cost altogether by simply
abolishing determinate sentencing.
G. The Blakely Jury: A Mere Factfinder or a
Democratic Institution?
Blakely is centered on an understanding of the jury as
a neutral factfinder and a procedural safeguard. In both
Blakely and Apprendi, the Court affirms that the Consti-
tution establishes a clear preference for jury factfinding in
criminal cases.9' More subtly, the Court suggests that this
constitutional preference is well-grounded in practice and
that twelve ordinary citizens are in fact likely to be fairer
factfinders than a single employee of the state. 9
Fairer verdicts are also expected to follow from the
heightened procedural standards that accompany jury
trials. A jury trial on enhancements would essentially
transform federal sentencing from a quasi-administrative
to an adversary process.9 3 Under the current federal
sentencing regime, judges make findings upon prepon-
derance of the evidence and in reliance on probation
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officers' reports full of hearsay. Defendants have limited
opportunities to contest disputed facts.94 Although this
process has the advantages of efficiency and ease of ad-
ministration, it may undermine the accuracy and fairness
of the ultimate sentence. Blakely, on the other hand, in-
troduces greater formality and procedural protections at
the sentencing stage. Under Blakely, the government's
case would be subject to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and defendants would be able to challenge each
sentencing allegation directly before the jury. The jury
would serve as the "circuitbreaker in the State's ma-
chinery of justice"95 and ensure the fairness of sentence
enhancements.
Blakely does not explain, however, why the jury's role
as a "circuitbreaker" should be confined to factfinding.
The history of the jury includes a limited power to make
legal and moral judgments related to sentencing.9' And
there is a strong argument that the jury is just as well-
equipped to make fair assessments of blameworthiness
as it is to make impartial findings of fact. 97
Indeed, advocates of the jury have never relied solely on
the objective superiority of the jury as a factfinding body.9'
Defenses of the jury have long drawn on its function as a
democratic institution.99 The Supreme Court hints at this
conception in Blakely, when it compares jury participation
to suffrage. I-o The Court further describes the jury as "no
mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation
of power in our constitutional structure .... meant to
ensure [the people's] control in the judiciary."'o' The jury
is not a mere factfinder, but an important element in our
system of popular sovereignty and separation of powers.
It may seem peculiar to emphasize the function of the
jury as a democratic institution in the sentencing process,
given the central role of the legislature in defining statu-
tory sentencing ranges. Yet social science suggests that
there may be good reasons to think that the legislative
process may not adequately reflect popular sentiments
on questions of sentencing. Citizens hold very different
attitudes about sentencing in the abstract versus sentenc-
ing in a particular case. ' Furthermore, legislatures could
not be expected to provide sufficiently detailed rules for
the complex sentencing scenarios that arise in individual
cases.
3
Pointing to the inability of the legislature to provide
adequate guidance in this area, many have called for
a return to discretionary judicial sentencing. Although
discretionary judicial sentencing is consistent with the
narrow holding of Blakely, it does not effectively serve
the democratic ideals of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth
Amendment was meant to reinforce the people's "control
in the judiciary"1°4 and to limit state power in criminal
cases. These concerns do not disappear - indeed, they
may increase - in discretionary sentencing schemes.
While present-day judges are not the Crown appointees
feared by ordinary citizens in colonial America, they may
still be too removed from the communities most affected
by their sentencing decisions."°5 Greater jury involvement
in sentencing ensures that sentences do not stray too far
from popular understandings of blameworthiness and
fairness.o
6
To give content to the notion of the jury as a democratic
institution, innovative legislatures could consider going
beyond Blakely. The most interesting consequence of
Blakely could come about if it prompted more states or
the federal system to move toward the systems of the six
states where full jury sentencing exists,1 °7 while preserving
a place for simplified or advisory guidelines and judicial
review. °s Juries could be entrusted not only with the
duty of finding the facts, but also with a greater share
of the moral and legal decision-making that underlies
sentencing.
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